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 MARK MY ESSAY (part1)!!
This will probably be disastorous but here goes.
remember all spellings are british but feel free to correct or point out mistakes you feel you can see. Note that i cant be arsed as im tired so the last bits are very scrappy.
Simple. Edit it!
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The break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought to a conclusion over 400 hundred years of centralised authoritarian rule in Russia. It marked the beginning of a new period that has been labelled the post-communist era, where a political void was left after the disintegration of the Soviet Empire and the dismantling of the Communist Party.
The Russian state that has replaced the Soviet Union, currently led by President Vladimir Putin, has thus been uniquely marked by more than a century of internal upheavals and radical changes. Yet, it is an over-simplification to suggest that contemporary events have singularly shaped Russian uniqueness. Rather, the current Russian situation has been sculptured by a combination of many phenomena.
During the nineteen sixties, political analysts became more engrossed in constructing categories which they could use to compare and contrast the range of political systems evident around the globe. The so-called ‘Third Wave’ of democratisations predominantly brought about these studies as an assorted range of authoritarian cultures began the democratising process in areas as diverse as Latin America and Southern Europe. The familiar terms of Authoritarianism, Totalitarianism and Democracy were thus fashioned in description. As a result, it is understandable that Transition studies have dominated the approach to comprehending contemporary Russia because it would appear that the authoritarian communist system will be replaced by various other models in the former Soviet Bloc states and also Russia itself.
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The core assumption of Transition studies is that the transitions of North American and Western European states from authoritarianism to Democracy, with the concurrent development of capitalism, provide ‘generalisable lessons and an analytical framework for understanding and promoting similar processes of change and outcomes in other states.’ Thus these studies, which are a ‘loose embodiment of political science approaches and ideas about the nature of political and economic development’ illustrate how the transition between authoritarianism and democracy should occur. They are therefore perceived to be useful in a Russian context as it is assumed that this type of transition will occur due to the collapse of communism and the acceptance of capitalist values. Of course, we must not forget that these studies assume that the Western model of democracy is the most advanced and effective, particularly the American version. Furthermore, these studies also insinuate that transitions only occur linearly leading to the decisive postulation that
the gradual ebb and flow of state development amidst the growth of the capitalist economy has resulted in the steady erosion of the political space for authoritarianism, culminating in the consolidation of democratic forms of government in most states in the course of the twentieth century
As Bowker and Ross note, Transition studies consist of two schools; the ‘functionalist’ school and the ‘genetic’ school. Both of these models seek to understand the transition process through different interpretations of data. For example, the ‘functionalist’ school is concerned with how modernisation affects the emergence of democracy. This would include
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studying how the long-term processes of socio-economic development change the nature of society. The key element of this hypothesis is that there is a definite correlation between the emergence of stable democracy and the growth of capitalist values, modernisation and affluence; which manifest themselves as the enlargement of the middle classes and development of security for the working classes. Essentially then, an informed and moderate middle class shifts political discourse to a less extremist position. When this is then coupled with capitalism’s tendency to concentrate the working classes, which subsequently leads to increased demands for social and political reform as well as improved organisation, the institutionalisation of democratic values is said to occur. This model is not without its critics however. There is evidence, as noted by Rueschemeyer, that the middle class do not always support working class demands for increased social and political reform. In fact the opposite has been proven to be true in certain contexts. What must be said of this model however is that the link between modernisation and democratisation is now accepted wisdom in democratic theory even though invariably we cannot suggest that transitions take place simply because of economic circumstances. Unfortunately though, the model is flawed as it does not recognise ‘that a systemic transition can devour the modernised social structures from which it is born’
In contrast, the ‘genetic’ model concentrates on how democracy comes in to existence through the role of agents and the importance of causation. Rustow is the pioneer of this model and he suggests that no minimum level of economic development is needed for a transition. Instead he suggests that a transition is a voluntary process whereby ruling elites
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decide to negotiate a political settlement. He identifies four key stages to this process; the first is a background phase known as national unity. In essence, national unity asserts that the boundaries of a territory must not be contested by any other nation either within or from outside the state; there must be cohesion. Furthermore, most, if not all, of the state’s citizens should identify with the state’s political community in order for national unity to exist. If this is the case then a transition is set in motion by a political struggle between the ruling elites and a new group of evolving elites. While Political polarisation is an expected outcome of this dispute, and this struggle constitutes the second phase of Rustow’s model, national unity should ensure the prolongation of the state. The third stage involves the institutionalisation of democratic values. Przeworski suggests this is needed because democracy is nothing more than ‘institutionalised uncertainty’ Elites play a major role in this phase by allowing negotiations and institutionalisation to take place while still retaining an element of power. This inevitably leads to the creation of a party system as elites mobilise into opposing groups, which is Rustow’s fourth point. He notes finally that political parties are the only institutional requisite of a completed transition. Again, this theory is not exact either. As noted above, modernisation’s link with democracy is an accepted wisdom of modern transition studies. Therefore, by ignoring this Rustow suggests no link between democratic development and economics which would seem incorrect. Furthermore, the genetic model’s reliance on characterising democracy by causation forces us to assume that methods of political participation are the distinguishing markers of its
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existence. The key problem with this of course is that it leads to the problem of ‘electoral fallacy’ Recent arguments have thus developed this theory to suggest that the true test of a transition is not just measured by the occurrence of free elections but instead by a change of government, the so-called ‘turnover test’ However, this may still pose problems. What seems obvious therefore about both the functionalist and genetic models, as described by Bowker and Ross, is that they try to use a strict analytical framework of previous events to illustrate or anticipate an approaching transition.
Perhaps the more authoritative literature on this subject is Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s work Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. It succinctly identifies the variables that bring about a transition and eventual consolidation of democratic government. What makes the work distinct is that unlike other compositions on democratic transitions it suggests clearly that ‘transitions may begin that are never completed’ and also that ‘we…do not want to imply that there is only one type of consolidated democracy.’ These two points immediately explain that transitions are a variable in themselves; there are many different types and they do not always produce the same end product. In the context of Russia, as any informed observer can distinguish, the so-called democratic political system does not closely match other such models found around the world .Therefore we must assume its transition path is different from those that have gone before which of course calls into question the legitimacy of both the functionalist and genetic models; that is of course if we assume a transition has taken place in Russia. In this sense, Linz and Stepan’s work is much more functional for analysis
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of the Russian political arena as it does not use a framework of a previous transition; it instead tries to find common features from within previous transitions.
Linz and Stepan begin by defining the two critical elements in transition studies; a completed democratic transition and a completed democratic consolidation. A completed transition is determined to be the following
A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is a direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure.
This definition is helpful in two very distinctive ways. Primarily it highlights the subtle differences between democratisation and liberalisation. This is important because it helps guard against ‘electoral fallacy’ and allows us to dismiss authoritarian governments who are posturing as democratic regimes through the use of liberal policies and rhetoric. Secondly, it highlights the importance of the decision making process in democratic states and the need for a consensus to legitimise the emerging democratic regime.
Liberalisation involves a mixture of policy and social changes that superficially appear more democratic. Examples would include an increase in media freedom, the freeing of political prisoners and the toleration of political opposition. Because these actions often lead to free elections in authoritarian states, liberalisation and democratisation have become confused. The key difference between the two concepts is that while both may entail free elections democratisation realises the
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contestation for the right to govern and produce new policy from such elections whereas liberalisation does not. Often, because free elections have been given such significance as a symbol of democratisation they have been understood to be both a feature and a condition of democracy leading again to the problem of ‘electoral fallacy’ Free elections are not a condition of democratisation, they are only a feature and by themselves do not denote democracy. Therefore, liberalisation is the beginning of a trend that is realised by democratisation, so it is often possible to have liberalisation without democratisation.
Yet even this initial statement seems to contradict other work in this area. For example, Mcfaul, Petrov and Ryabov have suggested that a transition has occurred once a minimal state of electoral democracy is present within a state. They define this as
QUOTE FROM MCFAUL AS TO WHAT ELECTORAL DEM IS
Thus, in similarity to Rustow, they assume a transition occurs when free elections are used to elect a popular government. But again, this problem of ‘electoral fallacy’ exists; we would find it hard to distinguish between genuinely contested elections and sham ones. Thus we have to assume that Linz and Stepan’s point is valid, that liberalisation can be mistaken for democratisation and that free elections alone do not denote a transition. Furthermore, McFaul, Petrov and Ryabov then make the point that for consolidation to be considered complete the state must move to a form of liberal democracy. As they argue
the phrase ‘democratic consolidation’ implies that quality and stability are two sides of the same coin. They are not, at least not in new democracies.
Therefore, consolidation to them requires the formation of liberal democracy and not just electoral democracy or any other stable partially
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democratic regime, something they nonetheless advise is plausibly possible. This seems partially hypocritical in that Linz and Stepan argue that not only are there many forms of democracy, but also that many of these forms are stable and obviously consolidated without being specifically liberal democracies.
The need for consensus agreement on the developing shape of the new regime is also important. While Linz and Stepan suggest the inevitability of disagreement over the exact shape of a new regime, they do suggest that prolonged argument is not in the best interests of consolidation
a deep and continuous confrontation and ambivalence about democratic institutions among the political elites and the majority of the population, with no sign of accommodation to the enacted institutions, is certainly not conducive to consolidation
So, while disagreement is normally positive for the transition process in that it helps to create a model suitable for all, these disputes must not go so far as to halt the transition process itself.
We need to be clear as to what constitutes a completed transition as it allows clear analysis of a state in transition. Frequently, non-democratic leaders and commentators argue that liberalisation features have brought about democracy in a state, when in reality it is a simple façade. This is also relevant in other contexts where regimes collapse and interim leaders take power. Again, while the collapse of an authoritarian regime may have occurred, that does not in itself denote the completion of a
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transition, the election of a new government with the power to implement policy does.
Although democracy may thus become established after a transition period this does not necessarily mean that it is consolidated; nor does it mean that the process is irreversible. There are often a number of tasks that need to be undertaken to move a transitioned state toward consolidation. Indeed, we must note that there are many forms of semi-consolidated and fully consolidated democracies and as we have already noted free elections and the creation of a liberal democratic government are not the most succinct way to establish this.
Therefore, Linz and Stepan use a three point definition to describe a consolidated democracy. This consists of elements of behaviour and attitude as well as constitutional dimensions. Perhaps the key point they make though, is that democracy must become ‘the only game in town’
Behaviourally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant national, social, economic, political or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or turning to violence or foreign intervention to secede from the state.
Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a society such as theirs and when support for antisystem alternatives is quite small or more or less isolated from the pro-democratic forces.
Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental forces alike, throughout the territory of the state, become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process.
If you read all that you suck, but thanks anyway.
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Originally Posted by Irisheyes
